Hegel on Arithmetic

 

Hegel wrote a decent bit on mathematics and associated topics, relevant today are his writings on arithmetic. Specifically, it's interesting to consider the analogies between a modern description of the integers (as a ring) and Hegel's treatment.

A Mathematical Prelude

Suppose we begin with a free group generated by a single symbol: \(M = \langle s, + \rangle\). We can get to this point by a variety of means, but we'll suppose it as our starting point. I think it is then interesting to ask, from where does multiplication emerge if we start from this vantage point? The answer is quite simple, many probably already know– all that is required is consideration of the mappings \(f : M \rightarrow M\): the endomorphisms. For any two endomorphism \(\phi\) and \(\psi\), we have a third endomorphism \(\phi \circ \psi\) as well as \(\phi + \psi\), and these operations behave in a manner so as to produce a ring.

Actually, more generally, any left \(R\)-module \(M\) can be viewed as a ring homomorphism from \(R\) into the ring of endomorphisms for \(M\). The point of all this today is that it suggests a relatively natural road to consideration of multiplication. In our simple free cyclic group, any homomorphism is determined by its image on the generator. Therefore \(s\) will be sent to \(\Sigma^n s = ns\) which is a natural analogue for multiplication by \(n\). Composition of these homomorphisms corresponds to multiplication of the numbers they correspond to, and likewise addition of them corresponds to the sum in an obvious way. So we've reconstructed the ring of integers.

The Hegelian Idea

Hegel had an alternate picture as to the construction of arithmetic, starting from his notion of quantity:

.. quantity is the determinateness which has become indifferent to being, a limit which is just as much no limit, being-for-self which is absolutely identical with being-for-other — a repulsion of the many ones which is directly the non-repulsion, the continuity of them.

Science of Logic, [1 § 387]

This definition warrants a bit of elaboration: what exactly does this mean? It's easier to read in the full context of the doctrine of being, but more or less the idea is that the individual entities in quantity, or the "being" underlying them, are unimportant. What is important is their limit, the division betwen them, but since there is no real difference between them when considering them from the point of view of quantity, it is not entirely proper to think of quantity as a "delimiting." Hegel singles out the nullification of difference in this form of determination (where things are separated and made what they are) when he says "a limit which is just as much no limit." In other words, quantity is a category of division, determination, wherein which the particular divisions between constituents are unimportant.

When we consider things as either being-for-self or being-for-other, we consider them as separate from the other, or distinct from the other, or the self, whatever way we have it. In quantity, the difference between this and that has been suppressed. It is essentially the "repulsion" or divisiveness of the beings in question which constitute the coherence of their quantity. It's important to note that we are considering some-things as "a quantity," not to say that we are considering quantity as merely a property of something else, to the extent that you find this distinction meaningful. When we consider a quantity as a quantity, the characteristics described above are evidenced.

When quantity itself is determined, for Hegel, an indifferent multitude is given structure by recognizing the continuity within the unities (singles) which comprise the multitude as well as the discreteness present in their separation, yielding a definite number. Continuity in this sense is self attraction, the lack of repulsion, self-sameness. All of this is to say that when we consider a multitude of discretely divided objects, each with continuity rendering them indistinguishable or undivided on their own, we find a definite number of objects. Hegel likes to proceed from here to construct arithmetic. Hegel identifies unity as the part of number which corresponds to continuity, and sum as the portion which corresponds to discreteness, the separation of otherwise indifferent continuities into sums.

So we have two aspects present: summation or combination into a discretely separated union, and unity or the presence of a continuous, self-same-ness. Unity in this sense corresponds not to additive unities in a group, but instead to the single free generator of the kind of group we mentioned in the introduction. Let's follow Hegel's exposition:

The Ones or the numbers themselves are indifferent towards each other, and hence the unity into which they are translated by the arithmetical operation takes the aspect of an external colligation. All reckoning is therefore making up the tale: and the difference between the species of it lies only in the qualitative constitution of the numbers of which we make up the tale. The principle for this constitution is given by the way we fix Unity and Annumeration.

Shorter Logic, [2 § 102]

This is, to my reading, more or less an emphasis of beginning with a free structure: all that really matters is our choice of unity and our method of agglomeration.

Numeration comes first: what we may call, making number; a colligation of as many units as we please. But to get a species of calculation, it is necessary that what we count up should be numbers already, and no longer a mere unit. First, and as they naturally come to hand, Numbers are quite vaguely numbers in general, and so, on the whole, unequal. The colligation, or telling the tale of these, is Addition.

Shorter Logic, [2 § 102]

Here we are introduced to the cyclic free monoid on our choice of unity. When Hegel says that "it is necessary that what we count up should be numbers already," he is referring to the capacity to consider sums as numbers, or as "no longer a mere unit." Addition is the inductive process by which the many inequal numbers are constructed, by discrete combination with a unity, something is incremented.

The second point of view under which we regard numbers is as equal, so that they make one unity, and of such there is an annumeration or sum before us. To tell the tale of these is Multiplication. It makes no matter in the process, how the functions of Sum and Unity are distributed between the two numbers, or factors of the product; either may be Sum and either may be Unity.

Shorter Logic, [2 § 102]

What Hegel posits here is uncannily similar to what was written in the introduction. Multiplication corresponds to equating a number to unity, and then considering the effect of this equation on numbers. This is more or less equal to taking the image of a homomorphism wherein which the generator (unity) is sent to some other member of the group. Hegel further comments on commutativity.

The third and final point of view is the equality of Sum (amount) and Unity. To number together numbers when so characterised is Involution; and in the first instance raising them to the square power. To raise the number to a higher power means in point of form to go on multiplying a number with itself an indefinite amount of times. Since this third type of calculation exhibits the complete equality of the sole existing distinction in number, viz. the distinction between Sum or amount and Unity, there can be no more than these three modes of calculation. Corresponding to the integration we have the dissolution of numbers according to the same features. Hence besides the three species mentioned, which may to that extent be called positive, there are three negative species of arithmetical operation.

Shorter Logic, [2 § 102]

When we evaluate a number under its own multiplication map, or when we consider it as the discrete structure or sum, as well as treating it as the identity, we get the first nonlinear operation: squaring. This for Hegel is a natural concluding point, since it involves continuity and discreteness equated in the structure of number. I find it interesting to arrive at an entirely similar view of arithmetic in this way, despite the technological differences in mathematical machinery. I find this treatment amenable to my own natural views on numbers, of course. I think often of nonlinearity, since it involves such an insidious and serious difficulty in mathematics today.

References

Sorry, I'm still getting my blogging setup oriented for citations. I'm more used to a pure latex situation for this sort of thing! The citations were a little wonky, but in this informal article, I figured it'd be fine.

[1] George Frideric Hegel, A.V. Miller, 1969, Allen & Unwin, Science of Logic, https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlbeing.htm
[2] George Frideric Hegel, William Wallace, Shorter Logic, 1975, Claredon Press, https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sl/slquant.htm